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Abstract
Introduction: The outbreak of cholera in Zimbabwe intensified interest in the control and prevention of cholera. While there
is agreement that safe water, sanitation, and personal hygiene are ideal for the long term control of cholera, there is
controversy about the role of newer approaches such as oral cholera vaccines (OCVs). In October 2009 the Strategic
Advisory Group of Experts advised the World Health Organization to consider reactive vaccination campaigns in response to
large cholera outbreaks. To evaluate the potential benefit of this pivotal change in WHO policy, we used existing data from
cholera outbreaks to simulate the number of cholera cases preventable by reactive mass vaccination.
Methods: Datasets of cholera outbreaks from three sites with varying cholera endemicity—Zimbabwe, Kolkata (India), and
Zanzibar (Tanzania)—were analysed to estimate the number of cholera cases preventable under differing response times,
vaccine coverage, and vaccine doses.
Findings: The large cholera outbreak in Zimbabwe started in mid August 2008 and by July 2009, 98,591 cholera cases had
been reported with 4,288 deaths attributed to cholera. If a rapid response had taken place and half of the population had
been vaccinated once the first 400 cases had occurred, as many as 34,900 (40%) cholera cases and 1,695 deaths (40%) could
have been prevented. In the sites with endemic cholera, Kolkata and Zanzibar, a significant number of cases could have
been prevented but the impact would have been less dramatic. A brisk response is required for outbreaks with the majority
of cases occurring during the early weeks. Even a delayed response can save a substantial number of cases and deaths in
long, drawn-out outbreaks. If circumstances prevent a rapid response there are good reasons to roll out cholera mass
vaccination campaigns well into the outbreak. Once a substantial proportion of a population is vaccinated, outbreaks in
subsequent years may be reduced if not prevented. A single dose vaccine would be of advantage in short, small outbreaks.
Conclusions: We show that reactive vaccine use can prevent cholera cases and is a rational response to cholera outbreaks in
endemic and non-endemic settings. In large and long outbreaks a reactive vaccination with a two-dose vaccine can prevent
a substantial proportion of cases. To make mass vaccination campaigns successful, it would be essential to agree when to
implement reactive vaccination campaigns and to have a dynamic and determined response team that is familiar with the
logistic challenges on standby. Most importantly, the decision makers in donor and recipient countries have to be
convinced of the benefit of reactive cholera vaccinations.
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Introduction
In October 2009, the World Health Organization’s (WHO)
Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE) on immunization
made the pivotal recommendation that oral cholera vaccination
should be considered as a reactive strategy in areas with ongoing
outbreaks. This is in addition to the continuing recommendation
that oral cholera vaccines be used in areas where the disease is
endemic and should be considered in areas at risk for outbreaks in
conjunction with other prevention and control strategies [1].
Previously, the WHO did not recommend oral cholera vaccination
once an outbreak had started due to ‘‘the time required to reach
protective efficacy and the high cost and heavy logistics associated
with its use’’ [2]. This reluctance has since changed because of the
emergence of large and prolonged outbreaks, particularly in sub-
Saharan Africa [3]. The large cholera outbreak in Zimbabwe is
the latest of these catastrophes [4]. By 2008, 179,323 (94%) of the
reported 190,130 cholera cases and 5,074 (99%) of 5,143 cholera
deaths reported to the WHO occurred in Africa [5].
There are two oral cholera vaccines (OCVs) available. Dukoral
is internationally licensed and prequalified by the WHO for
purchase by United Nations agencies and consists of inactivated
Vibrio cholerae O1 whole cells combined with the B subunit of the
cholera toxin (BS-WC). A large-scale field trial in Bangladesh in
the 1980’s showed that the BS-WC vaccine is safe and conferred
high-grade (,85%) protective efficacy (PE) during the first 6
months after vaccination, decreasing to ,60% during the
following 18 months and much lower ,20% in the 3
rd year
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been evaluated in Beira, a cholera endemic region of Mozam-
bique, which demonstrated the feasibility and effectiveness of
vaccination (PE,80% during the first year after vaccination)
under actual public health conditions in a setting in sub-Saharan
Africa [8]. Two more mass vaccination campaigns confirmed the
feasibility of this approach in the complex emergency settings of
Darfur, Sudan, and in Aceh, Indonesia [9]. A further WHO
sponsored evaluation of the BS-WC vaccine is currently under
way in Zanzibar. Mass vaccination campaigns with this vaccine in
other cholera endemic sites in sub-Saharan Africa are currently
under discussion. The BS-WC is administered with a buffer
solution in two doses with an interval of at least seven days.
Protection is conferred 7 to 10 days after the second dose. The
price of this vaccine which is produced in Sweden (approximately
USD $18–30/dose on the commercial market) has been a major
barrier to wider use. Recently a similar, much less expensive killed
OCV has been licensed in Vietnam and subsequently in India
[10,11] and is undergoing WHO prequalification. This second
vaccine (WC only), licensed in India as Shanchol, consists of WC
without a B subunit and does not require the co-administration of
a buffer solution. A double-blind, placebo-controlled trial showed
that this vaccine (given in two doses with a minimum inter-dose
interval of 14 days) is safe and efficacious, providing nearly 70%
protection against clinically significant cholera for at least 2 years
after vaccination [12]. Preparations for a trial of a single-dose
Shanchol regimen are underway.
The SAGE also recommended that the impact of oral cholera
vaccination in halting outbreaks should be documented. In the
absence of data from reactive vaccination campaigns we used
existing data from cholera outbreaks occurring in endemic and
non-endemic settings in Asia and Africa to compare actual cholera
outbreaks with simulated outbreaks during which a mass
vaccination takes place. To add realism to our simulation we
have varied the response times, and made estimates for single- and
two-dose vaccines.
Materials and Methods
Sites
Three sites in three countries Zimbabwe, Kolkata (India), and
Zanzibar (Tanzania) were selected based on a) availability of
reliable data and b) absence of interventions such as vaccinations.
The sites vary in cholera endemicity (Table 1). In Kolkata cholera
is endemic and seasonal cholera outbreaks can be predicted.
Cholera is also endemic in Zanzibar, however the location of
cholera clusters tends to shift between years and is not easily
predictable. In Zimbabwe cholera is not yet endemic. Large
cholera outbreaks occurred in 1999 and 2002 [5]. Between 2002
and 2008 no cholera outbreaks were reported. In Zanzibar and
Zimbabwe the large majority of cholera cases were clinically
diagnosed. In Kolkata all cholera cases were laboratory-
confirmed. A detailed description of the Kolkata site in has been
published [13].
Zimbabwe is a republic located in the southern part of Africa.
The population of the country is approximately 13,4 million. The
cholera outbreak in 2008/9 is one of the largest outbreaks ever
recorded. The outbreak started in August 2008, lasted for 49
weeks and affected all 10 of the country’s provinces. The data used
in our study comes from the daily cholera updates posted by
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA), Zimbabwe [14]. The large majority of reported
cases were based on clinical diagnosis. The daily updates were
entered in an excel spreadsheet and analysed. Since daily updates
were only posted from November 2008 onwards we extrapolated
the epidemic curve backwards between August, the date the first
cases were reported, and November 2008 when daily reporting
started. The country-wide attack rate during 49 weeks of the
2008/9 outbreak was 7.4 per 1000 population.
The site in India consists of legally registered urban slum areas
(bustees) within the administrative wards 29 and 30 in the city of
Kolkata [13]. The area has a high population density and residents
do not have sufficient water supply or sanitary facilities. A baseline
census of the study population was done in early 2003 and
Table 1. The study sites.
Zimbabwe Zanzibar, Tanzania Kolkata, India
Area under consideration Whole country Unguja and Pemba Ward 29, 30
Cholera endemicity epidemic endemic endemic
Population 13,4 million 1,182,804 57,099
Annualized cholera incidence - 0.5 per 1000 1.6 per 1000
Attack rate 7.39/1000 - -
Laboratory confirmation First cases only First cases only all
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0000952.t001
Author Summary
Cholera outbreaks have had catastrophic impact on
societies for centuries. Despite more than half a century
of advocacy for safe water, sanitation and hygiene,
approximately 100,000 cholera cases and 5,000 deaths
were reported in Zimbabwe between August 2008 and by
July 2009. Safe and effective oral cholera vaccines have
been licensed and used by affluent tourists for more than a
decade to prevent cholera. We asked whether oral cholera
vaccines could be used to protect high risk populations at
a time of cholera. We calculated how many cholera cases
could have been prevented if mass cholera vaccinations
would have been implemented in reaction to past cholera
outbreaks. We estimate that determined, well organized
mass vaccination campaigns could have prevented 34,900
(40%) cholera cases and 1,695 deaths (40%) in Zimbabwe.
In the sites with endemic cholera, Kolkata and Zanzibar, a
significant number of cases could have been prevented
but the impact would have been less dramatic. The
barriers which currently prevent the implementation of
mass vaccinations, including but not only the cost to
purchase the vaccine, seem insurmountable. A concerted
effort of donors and key decision makers will be needed to
offer better protection to populations at risk.
Case for Reactive Mass Oral Cholera Vaccination
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under surveillance for diarrhoea treated at any of the five project
health clinics set up in the field and the city’s infectious diseases and
children’s hospitals. Rectal swabs in Cary-Blair media were brought
on the same day from the project health outposts to the study
laboratoryat the National Instituteof Cholera and Enteric Diseases.
Vibrio cholerae were isolated and identified using standard
methods. The annualized cholera incidence during the surveillance
period from May 2003 to April 2005 was 1.6 per 1000 population.
In Zanzibar, the site consists of two islands Unguja and Pemba,
40km and 60km off mainland Tanzania, with a total population of
1,182,804 in 2008, calculated from 2002 national census data. In
Zanzibar the first cholera cases were detected in 1978. For this
study the seven outbreaks occurring in Unguja and Pemba during
the decade 1997 to 2007 were reviewed. In Unguja, cholera
patients tend to reside in densely populated urban areas with water
supply from communal and private taps. In contrast, in Pemba
outbreaks were mainly reported in rural areas, with shallow wells
as the primary water source. Routine surveillance reports
completed by the national surveillance system were reviewed.
The majority of cases are clinically diagnosed with the initial cases
laboratory confirmed using standard methods, at Mnazi Mmoja
Hospital in Unguja, and the Public Health Laboratory Ivo de
Canieri in Pemba. Between 1997 and 2007, 5640 cholera cases
were reported in Zanzibar, assuming a population of 1,037,183
during this period, the annualised incidence was 0.5 per 1000
population over the decade.
Definitions and assumptions
Outbreaks are defined as temporally- and geographically-clustered
cholera cases, separated by the absence of cases for a minimum of 6
months. We assume that the vaccine confers 85% protection during
the first 6 months following vaccination decreasing to 60% up to the
end of year 2 and 20% protection in the 3
rd year following
vaccination. We define vaccination as the ingestion of the OCV and
immunisation as the protective biologic response following vaccina-
tion (Table 2). Administration of two vaccine doses either at 7, 14 or
28–42 day intervals results in similar immune responses after the
second dose [15]. Protection against cholera can be expected to start
one week after the primary immunization series.
We assume the availability of a cholera vaccine through a
rotating stockpile to prevent the expiration of doses. The overall
response time is divided into the following components, the
outbreak is recognized, an agreement to send vaccine is reached,
the vaccine shipment arrives, vaccinations start, the administration
of the first dose is completed, delay between first and second dose,
second dose starts, vaccinations are completed, and finally the
participants are immunized (Table 2 and 3). There is currently no
agreement on a threshold to trigger cholera vaccination campaigns.
We assume that in the endemic settings such as Kolkata or
Zanzibar, the time from the report of the initial cholera cases to the
recognition that an outbreak is occurring could take between
24 hours to 6 weeks, the number of cases reported before an
outbreak was recognised under these assumptions is displayed in
Table 4. In contrast the outbreak in Zimbabwe was in a non-
endemic setting and orders of magnitude bigger. We arbitrarily set
the threshold which should have triggered a vaccination campaign
in Zimbabwe at 400 cases. The period required for the stockpile
administrators to come to an agreement to implement a mass oral
cholera vaccination and ship the vaccine could also take between
24 hours and 6 weeks. The vaccine shipment via air courier could
take between 2 and 6 weeks depending on the urgency as well as
potential delays clearing customs. Setting up the posts and starting
vaccination will take 1 to 4 weeks and completion of the first dose
will take 2 to 4 weeks. An interval of at least 7 days is required
between the two doses. Starting the administration of the second
dose will require up to 7 days, assuming staff and materials are on
stand-by following the first dose. Completion of the second dose will
take 2 to 4 weeks. The time required for vaccinated individuals to
mount an immune response is 7 days. In total, the minimum time
required to immunize the community is about 10 weeks, a delayed
response would be 21 weeks and in the worst case scenario, a
maximum response time could take as long as 33 weeks (Table 2).
The use of a hypothetical single-dose vaccine with similar
protective efficacy and duration of protection as the licensed two-
dose vaccine will reduce the response period, as the minimal delay
between first and second dose and the time to complete the second
dose will no longer apply. The use of single-dose vaccine would
reduce the rapid response time in our simulations from 10 weeks to
6 weeks (a 40% reduction), the delayed response time from 21 to
16 weeks (a 24% reduction) and finally a maximum response time
from 33 to 27 weeks, (an 18% reduction, Table 3).
Ethics
In compliance with Good Clinical Practice guidelines all
information that could reveal the identity of study participants
Table 2. Estimated response times to mount a mass oral cholera vaccination campaign, using a two-dose vaccine.
Response Period Range Rapid Delayed Maximum
1 An outbreak starts 1st reported case 1st reported case 1st reported case 1st reported case
2 An outbreak is recognized 24h–6 wks 24h 3 wks 6 wks
3 Agreement to send vaccine 24h–6 wks 24h 3 wks 6 wks
4 Vaccine shipment arrives 2 wks–6 wks 2 wks 4 wks 6 wks
5 Vaccinations start - first dose 1 wks–4 wks 1 wk 2 wks 4 wks
6 First dose is completed 2 wks–4 wks 2 wks 3 wks 4 wks
7 Minimal delay between first and second dose 1 wk 1 wk 1 wk 1 wk
8 Second dose starts 1 wk 1 wk 1 wk 1 wk
9 Vaccinations completed 2 wks–4 wks 2 wks 3 wks 4 wks
10 Community immunized 1 wk after last dose 1 wk after last dose 1 wk after last dose 1 wk after last dose
Total response time 10 wks 21 wks 33 wks
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0000952.t002
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investigators of the submitted study contained information which
could potentially reveal the identity of the participants. The data
from Zimbabwe was public domain data so ethics approval was is
not necessary. The data from Kolkata was collected in preparation
of large cholera vaccine trials. It was considered sufficient and
appropriate by the local investigators to obtain verbal, informed
consent since the participation in the study consisted of taking a
medical history, physical examination, testing of stool specimens.
All procedures included in the study participation are part of good
routine management of diarrhea patients. No experimental
procedures of any kind were conducted on study participants.
Besides the local (ethics committee of the National Institute of
Cholera and Enteric Diseases) and the national ethics review
committee (the Health Ministry Screening Committee of India),
the study was approved by the WHO Secretariat Committee on
Research Involving Human Subjects and the International
Vaccine Institute Institutional Review Board. The data from
Zanzibar was collected in preparation for a large cholera vaccine
effectiveness study. Data was summarised routine surveillance data
without any patient identifiers and so individual patient consent
was unobtainable and unnecessary. Permission to use the data was
granted by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Zanzibar,
who provided the data for the study.
Data analysis and modelling
We created graphs of each outbreak showing number of cholera
cases by week. The number of prevented cases (PC) was calculated
as the product of the number of reported cases (RC), protective
efficacy (PE), and percent of the population participating in mass
vaccination campaigns (Vaccine coverage, VC) or PC=RC6
PE6VC. PE was set at 85% during the first six months after
vaccination, 60% after 6 months and 20% in the third year based
on previously published data [6,7]. We assumed that between 50%
and 75% of the target population will participate in mass
vaccination campaigns. VC was therefore set at 50% and repeated
at 75%. The number of prevented cases was subtracted from the
reported number of cases to model the outbreak curves after mass
vaccinations. The number of prevented cases was calculated for
the varying response times shown in Table 2 for a two-dose
vaccine and in Table 3 for a single-dose vaccine.
Results
The effect of mass vaccination using the two-dose OCV
In Zimbabwe the first cholera cases were reported in August
2008 [5]. The outbreak reached its peak in the last week of
January 2009 and had subsided by the beginning of July 2009. By
July 2009, 98,591 cholera cases had been reported with 4,288
Table 3. Estimated response times to mount a mass oral cholera vaccination campaign, using a single-dose vaccine.
Response Period Range Rapid Delayed Maximum
1 An outbreak starts 1st reported case 1st reported case 1st reported case 1st reported case
2 An outbreak is recognized 24h–6 wks 24h 3 wks 6 wks
3 Agreement to send vaccine 24h–6 wks 24h 3 wks 6 wks
4 Vaccine shipment arrives 2 wks–6 wks 2 wks 4 wks 6 wks
5 Vaccinations start 1 wks–4 wks 1 wk 2 wks 4 wks
6 Vaccinations completed 2 wks–4 wks 2 wks 3 wks 4 wks
7 Community immunized 1 wk after last dose 1 wk after last dose 1 wk after last dose 1 wk after last dose
Total response time 6 weeks 16 weeks 27 weeks
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0000952.t003
Table 4. Cases which had been reported before the outbreak was recognised, initiating potential reactive vaccination efforts.
Site Year No. of cholera cases reported before the outbreak was recognised
Rapid response time
(24hrs after the first case)
Delayed (3 weeks
after the first case)
Maximum (6 weeks
after the first case)
Kolkata 2003 3 3 6
2004 1 51 84
2005 1 4 13
Unguja 1997–98 14 142 164
2002–03 14 62 119
2004–05 43 178 322
2006–07 2 73 154
Pemba 2002–03 6 28 81
2003–04 15 64 171
2006–07 21 124 167
In Zimbabwe 24 hrs, 3 weeks and 6 weeks after the first 400 cases had been reported (and the outbreak recognised) the total number of cumulative cases were 501,
1,401 and 3,501 respectively (i.e. including the first 400).
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0000952.t004
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was 4% with no significant decrease in CFR throughout the
outbreak. If a stockpile of cholera vaccines would have been
available mass vaccinations could have been implemented once a
critical number of cholera cases had been diagnosed. The
outbreak affected the whole of Zimbabwe hence a nationwide
vaccination campaign would have been required. We calculated
the reduction in cases that a two-dose vaccine would have
achieved under different conditions (Figs 1a to c and Table 5).
Had a rapid response taken place after the initial 400 cases had
been reported, we estimate that as many as 34,900 of 98,591
(40%) cholera cases and 1,695 of 4,288 (40%) deaths could have
been prevented by a mass OCV campaign with 50% coverage
(Fig 1a and Table 5). Delayed and maximum time responses
would have resulted in fewer cases prevented (Figs 1b and c and
Table 5).
In Kolkata three outbreaks in 2003, 2004, and 2005 were
reviewed. During the 2003 outbreak, 53 cases were detected. The
number of cholera cases that could have been prevented by
reactive mass vaccination with a coverage of 50%, was between 19
Figure 1. Estimated reduction in cholera cases during the Zimbabwe 2008–09 outbreak.* 1a: Following a rapid mass oral cholera vaccine
campaign with 50% coverage. 1b: Following a delayed mass oral cholera vaccine campaign with 50% coverage. 1c: Following a mass oral cholera
vaccine campaign with maximum delay and 50% coverage. *See Table 2 for the time point symbolized by each arrow. Figures show the epicurve of
the outbreak and the hypothetical number of cases prevented at response time.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0000952.g001
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www.plosntds.org 5 January 2011 | Volume 5 | Issue 1 | e952(36%) with a rapid response time to as low as 7 (13%) with a
delayed response time (Fig 2a and b and Table 5). With a higher
participation rate of 75%, which is realistic in this setting, the
number of cholera cases avoided increased to 29 (54%) with a
rapid response time (Table 5). There would be no reduction of
cases associated with a maximum response time of 33 weeks, as the
2003 outbreak lasted only 30 weeks (Figure 1c). During the 2004
outbreak, 136 cases were detected. The number of cholera cases
that could have been prevented by reactive mass vaccination with
a coverage of 50%, was between 18 (13%) with a rapid response,
14 (10%) with a delayed response and 3 (3%) with the maximum
response time (Fig 2d and e and Table 4). The number of cholera
cases which could have been prevented in the 2005 season is
shown in Table 5, the number of cases reported before an
outbreak is recognised is shown in Table 4.
In Unguja, Zanzibar four outbreaks were reviewed. From the
52
nd week of 1997 to the 34
th week of 1998 a total of 452 cases
were detected (0.85 cholera cases/1000 population). A reactive
island-wide mass vaccination campaign with 50% vaccine
coverage would have prevented 108 (24%) cholera cases with a
rapid response and 6 (1%) cases with the maximum response time.
With a 75% vaccine coverage, the number of cholera cases
prevented would have been 162 (36%) with a rapid response time
to 8 (2%), with the maximum response time. To initiate a rapid
response an outbreak would be recognised after 24 hours, when 14
cases had been reported, in a maximum response time an outbreak
would have been recognised after 6 weeks after a total of 164 cases
had been reported (Table 4). The number of cholera cases which
could have been prevented in three subsequent outbreaks is shown
in Table 5. In Pemba three outbreaks were reviewed. A total of
119 cholera cases were detected (0.32 cholera cases/1000
population) from the 50
th week of 2002 to the 12
th week of
2003. A reactive island-wide mass vaccination campaign with 50%
vaccine coverage would have prevented 5 (4%) cholera cases with
a rapid response time. Delayed and maximum response times did
not prevent any cholera cases. The following year the number of
preventable cases increased to 253 (29%) and 124 (14%)
respectively for rapid and maximum response times. The number
of cases that could be avoided during the following years and
under different assumptions is shown in Table 5, and the number
of cases reported before recognising an outbreak shown in Table 4.
Figure 3a to 3f shows the number of preventable cases in Unguja
and Pemba during the 2006–2007 outbreak had reactive vaccina-
tion been employed under different assumptions.
Protection in subsequent years
While the protective efficacy is waning in the years following
immunisation there remains ,60% PE during the following 18
months and ,20% PE in the 3
rd year following vaccination. More
cases are prevented in years following maximum and delayed
responses vaccinations as there is no delay in protection. In
endemic settings a reactive vaccination campaign using a the two-
dose OCV in the first outbreak with 50% coverage in Zanzibar,
would prevent 137–168 cases in Unguja and 184–189 cases in
Pemba during the three years following a rapid response and
maximum response vaccination campaigns, respectively (Table 6).
In Kolkata 43–55 cases would be prevented during the three years
following a rapid response and maximum response vaccinations,
respectively.
The effect of mass vaccination using a single-dose
vaccine
If a hypothetical single-dose vaccine with similar characteristics
as the two-dose vaccine would have been available for a rapid
mass vaccination in Zimbabwe, 41,059 cases could have been
prevented (42%) and 1,748 deaths (41%; Table 7). In three other
sites a single-dose vaccine in a rapid response vaccination could
have prevented a total of 1,768 cases (29%), reducing outbreak size
by 3% compared to a two-dose vaccine.
Discussion
We found that the number of cholera cases prevented by
reactive mass vaccination campaigns depends on the size and
shape of the outbreak curve. Reactive mass vaccinations can be
expected to be most effective in large, long-lasting outbreaks which
are most likely to occur in populations with no past exposure, i.e.
where cholera appears de novo or returns after a long period of
absence. In the presence of a sufficiently large, susceptible
population an outbreak can continue for months. The outbreak
Table 5. Cases that would have been prevented by mass oral vaccination oral cholera vaccine in three endemic sites.
Site Year Population
Outbreak
duration
Total
cholera
cases
Attack
rate/
1000
No. (%) cholera cases
prevented at variable response
times with 50% vaccine coverage
No. (%) cholera cases
prevented at variable response
times with 75% vaccine coverage
Rapid Delayed Maximum Rapid Delayed Maximum
Zimbabwe 2008–09 13,349,000 54 wks 98,591 7.39 34,900 (40) 12,789 (13) 474 (0) 59,100 (60) 19,183 (19) 711 (1)
Kolkata 2003 30 wks 53 0.91 19 (36) 7 (13) 0 (0) 29 (54) 10 (19) 0 (0)
2004 58,063 36 wks 136 2.34 18 (13) 14 (10) 3 (3) 27 (20) 21 (15) 5 (4)
2005 41 wks 33 0.59 8 (23) 5 (14) 1 (3) 11 (35) 7 (21) 1 (4)
Unguja 1997–98 534,512 35 wks 452 0.85 108 (24) 73 (16) 6 (1) 162 (36) 110 (24) 8 (2)
2002–03 643,905 88wks 687 1.07 164 (24) 163 (24) 162 (24) 246 (36) 243 (35) 243 (35)
2004–05 692,591 36wks 286 0.41 57 (20) 45 (16) 7 (3) 86 (30) 67 (23) 11 (4)
2006–07 745,262 63 wks 1974 2.65 558 (28) 610 (31) 546 (28) 837 (42) 915 (46) 819 (41)
Pemba 2002–03 368,910 14wks 119 0.32 5 (4) 0 (0) 0 (0) 8 (6) 0 (0) 0 (0)
2003–04 377,206 55 wks 862 2.29 253 (29) 261 (30) 124 (14) 379 (44) 391 (45) 186 (22)
2006–07 403,229 75 wks 1260 3.12 304 (24) 217 (17) 212 (17) 457 (36) 326 (26) 317 (25)
Mass vaccination is presumed to be using the currently licensed two-dose oral cholera vaccine at varying response times and vaccine coverage.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0000952.t005
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cases were reported. It has been estimated previously that cholera
outbreaks in a refugee camp last 20 weeks hence reactive
vaccination was unlikely to be cost–effective [16]. The large and
long cholera outbreak in Zimbabwe demonstrated a different
dynamic and lasted more than twice as long as average outbreaks
in refugee camps. A reactive cholera vaccination campaign would
have prevented significant numbers of cholera cases and deaths. In
contrast during shorter outbreaks in the endemic settings of
Kolkata and Zanzibar, where the majority of cases occur early on,
only an immediate, brisk response will prevent a substantial
number of cases. A second important finding was the minimal
advantage of a single-dose in reducing the number cholera cases
compared to a two-dose vaccine regimen. The advantage of single
dose vaccines was most pronounced in small short outbreaks and
less important in larger and longer outbreaks. A single dose
vaccine would increase coverage as there would be no drop out
between the first and the second dose.
Public health experts have considered establishing a cholera
vaccine stockpile similar to the existing yellow fever and the
meningococcal vaccine stockpiles [17,18]. A concerted effort to
distribute a hypothetical cholera vaccine stockpile could have
potentially prevented more than a third of the cholera cases and
deaths in Zimbabwe 2008–9. However there is currently no
cholera vaccine stockpile in existence which the international aid
community could have used for this purpose. Secondly there is a
consensus opinion that the political situation in Zimbabwe at the
time of the outbreak would have prevented mass vaccination
campaigns. Thirdly not all provinces were initially affected by the
cholera outbreak. Early strategically targeted mass vaccination
campaigns potentially could have prevented the spread of cholera
which ultimately affected all provinces. Important lessons could
and should be learned from this disaster for future cholera
outbreaks.
A major challenge for the administration of a cholera vaccine
stockpile will be a consensus on the number of cholera cases which
Figure 2. Estimated reduction in cholera cases in Kolkata.* 2b: During the 2003 outbreak following a delayed mass oral cholera vaccine
campaign with 50% coverage. 2a: During the 2003 outbreak following a rapid mass oral cholera vaccine campaign with 50% coverage. 2c: During the
2003 outbreak following a mass oral cholera vaccine campaign with maximum delay and 50% coverage. 2d: During the 2004 outbreak following a rapid
massoralcholeravaccinecampaignwith50%coverage.2e:Duringthe2004outbreakfollowingadelayedmassoralcholeravaccine campaignwith50%
coverage. 2f: During the 2004 outbreak following a mass oral cholera vaccine campaign with maximum delay and 50% coverage. *See Table 2 for the
time point symbolized by each arrow. Figures show the epicurve of the outbreak and the hypothetical number of cases prevented at response time.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0000952.g002
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www.plosntds.org 7 January 2011 | Volume 5 | Issue 1 | e952Figure 3. Estimated reduction in cholera cases in Zanzibar.* 3a: During the 2006–07 outbreak in Unguja following a rapid mass oral cholera
vaccine campaign with 50% coverage. 3b: During the 2006–07 outbreak in Unguja following a delayed mass oral cholera vaccine campaign with 50%
coverage. 3c: During the 2006–07 outbreak in Unguja following a mass oral cholera vaccine campaign with maximum delay and 50% coverage. 3d:
During the 2006–07 outbreak in Pemba following a rapid mass oral cholera vaccine campaign with 50% coverage. 3e: During the 2006–07 outbreak
in Pemba following a delayed mass oral cholera vaccine campaign with 50% coverage. 3f: During the 2006–07 outbreak in Pemba following a mass
oral cholera vaccine campaign with maximum delay and 50% coverage. *See Table 2 for the time point symbolized by each arrow. Figures show the
epicurve of the outbreak and the hypothetical number of cases prevented at response time.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0000952.g003
Table 6. The number of cases that would have been prevented during the initial outbreak and in the years following vaccination.
Site Year Population
Outbreak
duration
Total cho-
lera cases
Attack
rate/ 1000 The total numbers (%) of cholera cases prevented
Rapid Delayed Maximum
Kolkata 2003–05 58,063 142 wks 223 3.84 62 (28) 54 (24) 55 (25)
Unguja 2004–07 643,905 136 wks 2260 3.51 301 (13) 316 (14) 330 (15)
Pemba 2002–04 368,910 89 wks 750 2.03 189 (25) 189 (25) 189 (25)
The total number of cases which would have been prevented during the first outbreak and in the years following mass vaccination using the currently licensed two-
dose oral cholera vaccine with 50% vaccine coverage, and 85% PE in first 6 months, 60% PE from 6 to 18 months, and 20% for the following 3 years, at variable response
times.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0000952.t006
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The threshold should discriminate between sporadic cholera cases
and an outbreak. This threshold may have to be calibrated for the
cholera endemicity and the dynamics of outbreaks. The number of
cholera cases may have a different significance in a cholera
endemic area compared to an area where cholera hasn’t been
detected for several years. A steady increase in the daily number of
reported cases is more worrying than stable or a declining
numbers of daily cholera cases. In the absence of a consensus of a
threshold to start cholera mass vaccinations we have assumed for
the purpose of this paper that it may take between 24 hours and 6
weeks until a threshold is reached which triggers a mass
vaccination.
We have underestimated the benefit of vaccinations as we could
not include the added benefit of herd immunity which is likely to
further reduce the number of cholera cases and deaths.
Widespread administration of cholera vaccines protects the
vaccinated individual as well as the unvaccinated community
members with indirect protection proportional to vaccine
coverage [19]. Longini and co-workers have used modelled data
to show that cholera transmission could be controlled in endemic
areas with 50% coverage with OCVs [20]. However the available
evidence for herd immunity is based on data collected in a
randomised controlled trial conducted in Bangladesh in the 1980s
where cholera was endemic. We have currently no data on the
added protection conferred by herd immunity following reactive
vaccinations in cholera outbreaks. It seems likely that herd
immunity will have an additive effect in reactive vaccinations.
There is hope that a vaccine coverage of 50% or more may reduce
the basic reproductive number below equity and abort cholera
outbreaks altogether. However without empiric evidence it is
highly speculative trying to quantify the added protection
conferred by herd immunity. Estimating such added protection
conferred through herd immunity would be highly informative for
future mass vaccination campaigns.
Another limitation of this study was the selection of culture
confirmed cases from Kolkata. It seems likely that cholera cases
were not captured because they did not present to the treatment
centre or had false negative microbiology results. The true number
of cases is most likely higher. For our calculations, we used a
minimum inter-dose interval of 7 days which is recommended for
the BS-WC vaccine, whereas efficacy data is available only for an
inter-dose interval of 14 days for the WC-only vaccine [12]. Due
to the expected dropout between the first and second dose it may
be necessary to vaccinate 10 to 20% more people to achieve a
coverage of 50% or 75% with two complete doses. However the
14 day interval may not be essential as immunogenicity data
suggests protection starting even after a single dose [21,22]. Finally
our database may not be representative of other cholera outbreaks.
However in the absence of surveillance, other available epidemic
curves are likely to be incomplete, especially missing the cases at
the start of the outbreak. Furthermore the Kolkata data comes
from a restricted population which may have underestimated
outbreak duration compared to Zimbabwe and Zanzibar, where
data were collected from the whole population. Clearly our models
do not provide precise predictions of the number of cases
prevented but they serve to highlight questions and point to areas
where further research is needed.
As it is currently impossible to predict the size and shape of an
outbreak curve, our data suggest that time is of the essence, a brisk
response will provide most benefit. If circumstances prevent a
rapid response there remain good reasons to roll out cholera mass
vaccination campaigns in response to an outbreak report. Even if
the vaccination does not impact greatly the current outbreak, once
a substantial proportion of a population is vaccinated, outbreaks in
subsequent years may be reduced if not prevented. This benefit
should be taken into consideration when deciding on reactive
cholera vaccinations. Furthermore containment of the disease in
one area may prevent the spread to other susceptible populations.
Because outbreaks are heterogeneous a large number of outbreaks
would have to be randomized to assess the impact of reactive
vaccinations. Hence a meaningful assessment of the impact of
reactive mass vaccinations may not be feasible. Modelling the cost
effectiveness of reactive mass vaccinations may well provide
further evidence of the benefit of this intervention.
Our findings support the SAGE recommendations to include
reactive mass vaccination campaigns in the interventions to
manage cholera outbreaks. An explosive cholera outbreak in
Haiti at the end of 2010, where a population of 10.1 million people
has no prior immunity has added poignancy to our report [23].
Table 7. Cases that would have been prevented by mass vaccination using a hypothetical single-dose oral cholera vaccine.
Site Year Population
Outbreak
duration
Total
cholera
cases
Attack
rate/
1000
No. (%) cholera cases
prevented at variable response
times with 50% vaccine coverage
No. (%) cholera cases
prevented at variable response
times with 75% vaccine coverage
Rapid Delayed Maximum Rapid Delayed Maximum
Zimbabwe 2008–09 13,349,000 54 wks 98,591 7.39 41,059 (42) 28,075 (28) 3,038 (3) 61,589 (62) 42,112 (43) 4,557 (5)
Kolkata 2003 30 wks 53 0.91 20 (37) 16 (30) 2 (4) 30 (56) 24 (47) 3 (6)
2004 58,063 36 wks 136 2.34 23 (17) 16 (12) 16 (4) 35 (25) 24 (18) 9 (7)
2005 41 wks 33 0.59 9 (27) 6 (19) 3 (10) 13 (40) 10 (29) 5 (15)
Unguja 1997–98 534,512 35 wks 452 0.85 124 (27) 84 (19) 53 (12) 185 (41) 126 (28) 80 (18)
2002–03 643,905 88wks 687 1.07 195 (28) 142 (21) 161 (23) 292 (42) 213 (31) 242 (35)
2004–05 692,591 36wks 286 0.41 88 (31) 45 (16) 28 (10) 132 (42) 68 (24) 42 (15)
2006–07 745,262 63 wks 1974 2.65 621 (31) 546 (28) 515 (26) 931 (47) 820 (42) 773 (39)
Pemba 2002–03 368,910 14wks 119 0.32 22 (18) 0 (0) 0 (0) 33 (27) 0 (0) 0 (0)
2003–04 377,206 55 wks 862 2.29 267 (31) 266 (31) 216 (25) 400 (46) 399 (46) 324 (38)
2006–07 403,229 75 wks 1260 3.12 315 (25) 285 (23) 202 (16) 473 (38) 427 (34) 303 (24)
Varying response times and vaccine coverage are shown for the three sites.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0000952.t007
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www.plosntds.org 9 January 2011 | Volume 5 | Issue 1 | e952There is an urgent need for financial mechanisms to establish and
maintain a stockpile of cholera vaccines as well as a determined
and dynamic team to administer such a stockpile. Perhaps most
importantly decision makers in affected countries have to become
aware of the benefit of reactive vaccination campaigns and actively
promote their use.
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